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IN THE SUPREMF. COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH

Dl TEE MATTER

m,

)
APPEAL

THE ESTATE

OF FRED W. HARPER,

)
No. 8049

Decee_sed.

)
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal tram the Third Judicial District Court

of the State a£ Utah

Honorable Clarence E. Baker. Judge
STATEMENT CF FACTS

Zilpha D. Harper, the Petitioner and Respondent,

and Fred

w.

Harper, the deceased, were husband and

wife and owned property in joint tenancy in Salt Lal<:e

City, Utah.
a~.rded

On December 24, 1949, Fred

w.

Harper was

a decree of divorce fran Zilpha D. Harper,

and he was also a\ve.rded the above mentioned property

in said decree.

Zilpha D. Harper entered her appearance

in the action and waived time in Which to answer or
otherwise plead.

She received a copy of plaintiff's
- 1-
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oamplaint which

pr~ed

ot the property to l'red

for the divorce and tha award

w.

Harper, and consented the. t

the divorce might be entered against her and the matter
heard upon the merits at any time without further notice

to her.

The property and the divorce were awarded to

Fred W. Harper, the grounds of the di?oroe being her
desertion (R~ 20~26)

Approximately two weeks before the interlocutory
period had run and the divorce became final, Fred

w.

Harper died (June 7, 1950), leaving a son by

a former marriage (Ro 11, 5).

record that Zilpha D.

Ha~r

It appears from the
on June 19, 1950,

approximately a week before the

interlocuto~

period

had run, in great hastcwent into court ex parte and

without notice to any to set the divorce decree asidej
the petition in this action recited t;he death of
Fred 17\f. F.arper, and it was granted and an order "vas

entered setting the divorce decree aside.

There was

no mention of' the property interests in the order (Ro 28)

Apparently realizing that her procedure in this

- 2 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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action was deteotiv:e, the Petitioner brought an

action on 1Ia.y 22, 1951, to "Establish Rights and to
Ter.minate Joint Tenanoyn o

At this· time notice· was.:

given to the son and m.other of Fred ·d. Harper and to
the Administrator, the Contestan'tt and Appellant in

thi~~

action, answered, denying that Zilpha D «> Harper had
any- right-s in the property in question and clai!ni.ng that

the property belonged to the .Estate of Fred W. Harper

(R .. J.Qc7).
The facts were submitted upon stipulatiorr to

the~

trial court, and the trial court granted the petition

to termi.nata the_ joint tenancy and held that the estate
of Fred -w. Harper ha.rl no interest in_ the property, fr.om

which decision the Contestand and Appellcnt now appeals

(R. 10-12).
STA'!'IDJU];NT OF POINTS

· It

w~

the Bespondent' :3' contention in the action

to terminate the aforesaid joint tenancy, that the.
effect of Fred W. Harper's death before the running·

of the interlocutory period

and/or

the petition to

vacate the divorce decree resulted in the property

-3-
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award being null and void, which vested the sole ownership

or

the property in the Respondent by virtue of

being being the sole survivor of a joint tenancyo
It is the contention

death of Fred

w.

or

the Appellant that the

Harper during the interlocutory period

did not set the property interests awarded by the
interlocutory decree at large; that such property interests
were defeasible, if at all, only by proper judicial

proceedings, which should have included notice and
opportunity to be heard to the heirs and administra-

tor of the Estate of Fred

w.

Harper.

It is the further

contention of the Appellant that since notice and
opportunity to be heard was not given to the heirs
e.nd administrator of' the Estate of Fre~ W. Harper that

the property in question remained the property
o£ said estate and that Zilpha D. Harper had no rights
therein.
Appellant therefore believes that the trial court
erred in terminating the joint tenancy and in holding
that the Estate of Fred lf. Harper had no interest
therein, and in further holding +.hat Zilpha Do
Harper was ent:i.tled

·co

s o!;:.e right or title or interest

therein and relies upon the following points for a
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-

reversal of this decision•
1.

THE TRIAL COURT S~-I'~·Trt.:J F.AVE HELD THAT THE

DEATH 0? A SPOtTSE DURING THE INTERLOCUTORY PRPIOD
DOES NOT sgT THE PROPE.."R.TY INTERESTS IN THE JNTERLOCU·

TORY DECREE AT LARGE.
2.

THE TRIAL COURT S!!OULD HAVE HELD

1H..~T

TJifE SE

PROPERTY INTERESTS VI!ERE DEFEASIBIF., IF AT ALL, O:NLY
BY GIVING NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO BE HE.d.R:"'J TO TEE
HEIF.S A.l\lD ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF TEE

DEC~..SFD

SPOUSE.
3.

TEE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD THAT THE

SUIDTIVING SPOUSE FAD
OF TEE

DF.CE.~ED

~TO

INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY

SPOUSE BECAUSE A DIVISION OF PROPERTY

HAD BEEN EFFECTED.
ARGUlviENT

1.

THE TRIAL COURT

SHO~D

DFJ\.TH OF A SPOUSE DURING TEE

DOES NOT SET TEE PROPERTY

TORY DECREE AT LARGE.

HAVE HELD THA.T TEE

I~ITERLOCUTORY PE~RIOD

mTFBE.~TS

IN THE INTERLOCU-

It should be noted at the out-

set that the Respondent's theory is quite anamalouso

She

cl~. ims

all of' the property by virtue of being the

sole survivor of a joint tenancy.

The fragility of

a joint tenancy is too well known to require citation.
TJ -

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~-~-·~ A~~ect

of the interlocutory decree award-

•

all o£ the property to the husband would be to

destroy the joir.rt tenancy.

But she asserts tho.t her

action in attempting to set ·the interlocutory decree

aside reinstated the joint tenanoy.
was then dead.

But her husband

Even if the court desired to do this,

how could it make her e. joint teaant with e. deceased

persont
The general rule and the rule followed in Utah

as set forth in Re Johnson's Estate, 35 P 2d 305,
84 Utah

16~~

is that where one of the parties to a

divorce action dies within the interlocutory period
the surviving spouse is still considered to be married
to the decedent and has all of the rights of the
marital status.

The reason usually given is that

a divorce aution is a purely personal action and
abates with death, 76
therein.

ALR 284, and cases cited

But where property interests are awarded

by the decree, the interlocutory decree may speak

conclusively.

~:uoting

from 104 A.LR 660:

"It has been held that Where an interlocutory
decree of divorce rendered before the death of
one of the parties to the action deals not only
with the personal status of the parties, but
also with the property rights, it may, if not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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- 8 ...

vacated in the mode prescribed by law, beoo.mes a
final and oonclus:i.ve decree e.s to the right of
property notwithstanding the death of one o£ the
parties to the action. Abbot v. Superior Ct. {1924)
29 Cal. App 660. 232 P. 154; Klebora v. Kibora
(1931) 118 Cal. App. 313, 5 P. (2d) 965o The
court in the latter case saida 'The appellant's
five contentions which have been enun1erated are
really reducible to this--that the death of one
of the spouses before the year has run is produc•
tive of the same legal consequences as to property
rights ettled by an interlocutory, as those
produced with respect to the marital status; in
other words, the death automatically vacates the
adjudication and sets the question of property rights
at large. Such contentions finds no support
in the authorities. The cases, indeed, are all
the other way. It may be argued that the Gould
case (Cel. Infra) is distinguishable because
there an agreement formed the basis for the
decree. The appellant stresses the point that
here there was no agreement; but that can make no
difference, for a 'judgment' is a contract, in
the highest sense of the term' •••• Death would 1.ot
have set at naught an ag~eement bet~~en the spouses•
If, then, .they could have settled their property
rights with finality by contract, it is difficult
to perceive, in

of the rule just discussed,
how a judgment which does the same thing possesses
via'VIr

no such finality, and is of lesser dignity.
So, it was held in Gould v. Superior Cto
· (1920) 47 Cal. App. 197, 191 P. 56, that while,
after the death of one of the parties to a
divorce suit, the court which has theretofore
entered an interlocutory decree of divorce loses
jurisdiction to enter a final decree thereafter
dissolving the marriage status, where property
rights of the parties have been fixed by an
agreement and confirmed by the interlocutory
decree, the deat~ of one of the parties does
not oust the court of jurisdiction to enter
a final decree e.s to such property rightsG"
In other words, the reason that the decree
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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given a different status from the marital relationship is that it is

or

ths nature of a contre.ct.,

only of a higher dignity, and hence survives the
death of a spouse;

C0"1.lerr~ th~t

intrinsic also is the

the property rights have been fully litigated; that
it is res adjud:tcata, and that; the death

or

e. spouse

in itself adds nothing to the faot that the issue
has been fully litigated.
Although we have f'ound no Utah case exactly in

point, there is a strong inference in In Re Johnson's

Estate, supra, that Utah follows the majority ruleo

In tbAt case it is held:
11 It

is further contended by appellant

tnt. since

the decree of divorce provided for the payment
of alimony in the sum of $10.00 per month,
this was such a property settlement between the
parties to the decree as to preclude the plaintiff
fram having any interest in the estate or her
deceased husban~ and, having no interest in his
personal estate~ she could be disqualified from
administering his estate under Com. Laws Utah

1917 Sec. 7596, now Rev. St. Utah 1933, Sec.
102-4-1 0 The decree itself is silent on the
matter or property settlement or division. The
awarding of alimony in the decree in this case
cannot be said to be an adjudication of property
rights so as to preclude plaintiff from havin
an interes in t e ecease
us an 's estate as
his widow••••1J\1hether an e:vvard of alimony may not
be considered aB a property division under any
circumstances, we do not decide. -v~·e simply hold
- 8 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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That the award involved in this case did not
constitute rt property division-ott (emphasis our

own).
In the case under consideration we definitely do
have an adjudication of property rights, a division of
property based upon the degree o£ guilt.

Henoe, it

we follow the inference of the Johnson Case, supra,

and the general rule as established in other states,
we must conclude that the decree speaks finally as to

those property rights adjudicated.

We fUrther contend

that under the Utah rule where property right;s are

adjudicated in the divorce decree, the vdfa (or other
spouse) is precluded fram further sharing in the estate
of the deceased spouse.
We also maintain

tr~.t

this rule is founded upon

strong and compelling equitable considerations and
is not merely spun from the fabric of' metaphysical

legal logic.

The innocent and moving party in a divorce

action is usually awarded a larger portion, if not all,

or

the property.

In such circumstances, if the rule

were otherwise, it would be the guilty party, not
the izmooent part:r, who would attack the decree; and

it would be the guilty party who would profit fram
a different

rule~
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----'-,·· +'h; ~ Court intends to follow the Kansas

rule of

Dt~land

v. Durland, 67 Kan. 734, 74 P 274,

where under similar circumstances it was held
{see 76 .ALR 291) that tha provis:i

0!1)3

of the divorce

statute in accordance with ·whioh the decree was

rendered were intended to prevent a marriage by either

party

'~thin

six months after the decree and that as

to that matter only the decree was not final, every
other result was a canpleta dissolution of the marriage
following at once.

Se also to the

same

effect is

Jacobs v. Gaskill, 69 Kan. 872. 77 P 550o
2•

THE TRIAL COURT. SHOuLD HA1fE :EmLD THAT THESE

PROPERTY mTERESTS ViERE DEFEASIBLE, IF .AT ALL,

O~TLY

BY GIVThiG NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO BE 1.TF'J\RD TO
~

HEIRS .MJ"'D TO TEE ADMINISTRATOR 0:7 THE EST.A.TE OF

THE DECEASED SPOUSE.

It will be recalled that under

the hYbrid theory of the Respondent that she claims

all of the property by virtue• of being the sole
survivor of a joint tenancy.

Since the trial court

entering the order setting the decree aside could not
make her a joint tenant with a deceased peron•• and
since no order was entered transferring the entire
property to her, the only theory under Which this
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
con·tention
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tory award of the property had no effect vrha·tsoever,
and that the joint tenancy in existence before the

decree in fact continued throughout the interlocutory
period notwithstanding the

co~t• s

of the property to her hus.band.

interlocw.tory avrard

I.m1 other words, from

the standpoint of theory, the court would ha.w to hold

mot only that the decree set the property interests at
large_ but that the interlocutory award of the property

had no effect whatsoever.
The property interests established by the interlocu-

tory decree are not

~

the death of one of the

tory periodo

vapid as to disintegrate upon,
spouses~

during the interlocu-

The rule in_ Utah seems quite_. clearo

There is substantial authority to the effect that the:property interests eatablished by the interlocutory
decree are wasted subj eet only to divestment by proper

judicial proceedingso

It should also be recalled

that under our practice no further

a~

is

requi~ed

to complete the div:ore£); it becomes final automatically
upon the expiration of the interlocutory period, and
it is not necessary as it is: in·. some states to file

a finaJ. decreea
In Rasmussemvo Call, lSS P 275, 55 Utah 597,
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,,

the wife secured a divorce from the husband, and the:
husband before the interlocutory period had run o.ame
in ex parte and without notice to the wife and had

the court on its om motion vac-ate the decree.
husband argued that the court could

vac~ate

The

the decree

upon its own motion by v.d..rtue of Como Law 1.917, Section
2002 (now, unchanged, Utah Code Annotated, 1943J

40-3-7). This- coUl't held, quoting from page; 276:
in section 2002, supr·a, proeee.dings: to
r.e"'iew the decree upon the oour.t' s own motion
are mentioned; but it was not wi.thint the contemplation of the Legis-l.ature that aufficient cause;
could D:e determined to exist without an opportunity
~given} to the parties interest t.o be heard in·_
defense of any rights granted by the interloc.utory decree. 'Sufficient cause' means leg~
cause. To deprive plaintiff of the rights~
given her by the interlocutory decree without
notice_ and opportunity to be heard is not due
proeess of law; in fact, it is without any
process on
n~ue,

The court says: on page 276: "The ef'f.eat of the
interlocutory decree being to vest . im. plaintiff'
ce~tain personal andprope~ty rights, it neeessarily
follows- that the existence of those righta. denies
to any court the authority or right to ta.ke the
s:am.e from her J except upon legal proceedings~ in
'mich plaintiff, as the interested party, has
an opportunity to be heard in disproof of any
attacks upon,_ such rights, and to establish the
fact that she i.s j ust,ly entitled to the rights
sought to be ts:en from her. tt (emphasis our ovvn)
It

follows~

that if the property interests estahlished

by the interlocutory
decree
areprovided
vested
spouse
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library.
Funding for digitization
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so that the absence of notice and opportunity to be
heard would violate due process requirements that
the same requirement extends to the heirs and the
administrator

or

the estate

or

the deceased spousao

In 17 Am. Jur. 375, Section 457, it is heldt
"Persons whose interests will be adversely affected
by the vacation of the judgment or decree must be
made parties defendant to the proceedings, and must
be served with process ••••Where the husband at
whose instance the divorce was procured ,dies
leaving both real and personal. estate in w.hich 1he
surviving wife would have had an interest except
for the divorce, both the personal representatives
and the heirs of the husband are prop~r parties
to proceedings by the wife to vacate the judgment
or decree."
See also Morris v. Propst, 65 P 2d 944 (Colorado,
1936) where the court saysa

"A divorce action is a purely personal action
I

which does not survive the death of either
party. A seemdng exception, apparent only,
arises When such an aotion involves an issue
of property. ·In that event, of course, the
administrator must not merely be noticed into
court, but he must be proceeded against as a
part.y, either by proper substitution or in a
separate action; and, where the ppoperty issue
is thus made, the persons interested as heirs
or otherwise must be made parties and. ~iven
their day in court."
We subm.it therefore that the court entering the
order setting the decree aside had no jurisdiction
to do so~ so-far as it concerned the property interests
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of the heirs and the Estate of
III.

F~ed

w.

Harper.

THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE HEID THAT THE

SURVIVL\JG SPOUSE HAd NOT. iNTEREST IN THE PROPFltTY
OF THE DECEAS:ED SPOUSE BECAUSE A DIVISION OF PROPERTY

HAD BEEN EFFECTED.

It follows. that if the abo'\te

two propositions propounded
correct,

~hat

by the Appellant are

the pr-operty in question belongs: to

the estate of the deceased spouse.

The nexil ques.tion

for consideration is whether the. s-urviving spouse.
should share as an heir or otherwide in the es;,tate::
of the deceased spouse." If

this~

Court should Chosa

to follow the rule, in the Kansas_ c-ases_, supra, or

th& inference in the

J~bhnson

Case, supra, there is

no question that the sur'9!iving spouse in the instant
case would be precluded from sharing further in the
estate of the deceased s.pouse o

There is no question

that in the case under consideration a div.ision of

property was: made, and the property vras awarded to
the innocent party.
However, in any event, it should be remembered
that the grou..'l1.ds: for the divorce in the present case

were desertion.

Although the general rule in the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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case of desertion is thet the dower of the deserting

spouse is not barred, she is barred £ram asserting
her distributive share, 71 ALR 285.
CONCLUSION

To rscapitulate,., we submit that the affect of the

interlocutory decree was to vest in the deceased spouse
the property rights awarded by the decree; that these

interests

~re

defeasible, if at all, only by proper

judicial procealngs. by giving notice and opportunity
to be heard to the heirs and the administrator of' the
estate of the deceased spouseJ that such proper judicial
proceedings were not hadJ and that since a division 0£

property had been effected, the surviving spouse was
not entitled to share in the property• which remained
property of the estate of the deceased spouse• either

as an heir or otherwise,
We therefore respectfully request that the decision of the trial court be reversed and that the
property in question is the property of.the estate
of Fred W. Harper and that Zilphe. D. Harper has no

rights or interests therein.
Respectfiully submitted,

CHRIST T. PPAGGASTIS,
JOHN E. STO:NE,

Attorneys for Contestant
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